Arbeitspapier
Mediated audits
I study the optimal audit mechanism when the principal cannot commit to an audit strategy. Invoking a relevation principle, the agent reports her type to a mediator whi assigns contracts and recommends the principla whether to audit. For each reported type the mediator randomizes over a base-contract and the audit contract, accompanied by a recommendation to audit. For large penalties the optimal mechanism uses strictly more contracts than types and cannot be implemented via offering a menu of contracts. The analysis provides a proper benchmark for studying auditing under limited commitment and sheds new light on the usefulness of mediation in contracting and on the design of optimal mechanisms.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 509
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
-
auditing
limited commitment
mediation
contract theory
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Pollrich, Martin
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
-
München
- (when)
-
2015
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.20242024, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Pollrich, Martin
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2015
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Mediated truth
Compliance with endogenous audit probabilities
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The dynamic effects of tax audits
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Audit-staff scheduling by column generation
Strategic decision behavior and audit quality of big and small audit firms in a tendering process
Do audits improve future tax compliance in the absence of penalties? Evidence from random Audits in Norway
Do Audits Improve Future Tax Compliance in the Absence of Penalties? Evidence from Random Audits in Norway