What clients want: Choices between lawyers' offerings

Arbeitspapier

We analyze a client's choice of contract in auctions where Dutch law firms compete for cases. The distinguishing feature is that lawyers may submit bids with any fee arrangement they prefer: an hourly rate, a fixed fee or a \mixed fee," which is a time-capped fixed fee plus an hourly rate for any additional hours should the case take longer than expected. This format of selling legal services is unusual in that it both forces lawyers to compete directly against each other and allows clients to easily compare these different offers. We estimate a choice model for clients and find robust evidence that hourly rate bids are a client's least-preferred choice. Our findings tentatively contradict lawyers' often made argument that hourly rates are in a client's best interest.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1460

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law) ; Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
• Thema: lawyers' fee arrangements ; clients' choices ; discrete choice models

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Felsö, Flóra ; Onderstal, Sander ; Seldeslachts, Jo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108731
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ