Paying by the hour: The least appealing option for clients of lawyers

Artikel

In this study, we analyze a client's choice of contract in auctions where Dutch law firms compete for cases. The distinguishing feature is that lawyers may submit bids with any fee arrangement they wish. We find robust evidence that bids offering hourly rates are less attractive to clients. Our findings tentatively contradict lawyers' often-made argument that hourly rates are in a client's best interest.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: DIW Economic Bulletin ; ISSN: 2192-7219 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 26/27 ; Pages: 295-299 ; Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law) ; Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
• Thema: lawyers' fee arrangements ; clients' choices ; discrete choice models

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Seldeslachts, Jo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/144188
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ