Paying by the hour: The least appealing option for clients of lawyers

Artikel

In this study, we analyze a client's choice of contract in auctions where Dutch law firms compete for cases. The distinguishing feature is that lawyers may submit bids with any fee arrangement they wish. We find robust evidence that bids offering hourly rates are less attractive to clients. Our findings tentatively contradict lawyers' often-made argument that hourly rates are in a client's best interest.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: DIW Economic Bulletin ; ISSN: 2192-7219 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 26/27 ; Pages: 295-299 ; Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law) ; Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
• Subject: lawyers' fee arrangements ; clients' choices ; discrete choice models

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Seldeslachts, Jo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/144188
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET