Arbeitspapier

Imperfect Signals

A pre-condition for employer learning is that signals at labor market entry do not fully reveal graduates' productivity. I model various distinct sources of signal imperfection—such as noise and multi-dimensional types—and characterize their implications for the private return to skill acquisition. Structural estimates using NLSY data suggest an important role for noise, pushing the private return below the social return. This induces substantial under-investment and causes output losses of up to 22 percent. Value-added-based evidence from Swedish high school graduates also points to noise and under-investment. Highlighting the distinction between schooling duration and skills acquired, I conclude that individuals likely spend too much time in school, but learn too little.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10403

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Returns to Education
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Thema
human capital
signalling
employer learning
returns to schooling

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Graetz, Georg
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2023

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Graetz, Georg
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2023

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