Horizontal Mergers and Exit in Declining Industries

Arbeitspapier

Previous work on exit in declining industries has neglected mergers. We examine a simple model that predicts which declining industries experience horizontal mergers. Mergers are more likely if 1) market concentration is high; 2) the inverse demand curve is steep at high levels of output and flat at low levels of output; and 3) the industry declines slowly early on and rapidly later on. The conditions that make mergers privately profitable also tend to make them socially optimal. We test the model using U.S. manufacturing industries that declined during 1975-1995 and find some empirical support.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics ; No. 2001-13

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Thema: takeover ; restructuring ; consolidation ; industry dynamics ; failing industries

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Filson, Darren ; Songsamphant, Bunchon
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics
• (wo): Claremont, CA
• (wann): 2001

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94653
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ