Arbeitspapier

Safe payments

We use a simple model to study whether private payment systems based on bank deposits can provide the optimal level of safety. In the model, bank deposits backed by projects are subject to default risk that can be mitigated by a depositor's ex ante and ex post monitoring. Safe payment instruments issued by a narrow bank can also be used as a back-up payment system when the risky bank fails. Private adoption of safe payment instruments is generally not socially optimal when buyers do not fully internalize the externalities of their adoption decision on sellers, or when the provision of deposit insurance distorts their adoption incentives. Using this framework, we discuss the optimal subsidy policy conditional on the level of deposit insurance.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2020-53

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Thema
Central bank research
Digital currencies and fintech
Financial institutions
Payment clearing and settlement systems

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Chiu, Jonathan
Davoodalhosseini, Seyed Mohammadreza
Jiang, Janet Hua
Zhu, Yu
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2020-53
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Chiu, Jonathan
  • Davoodalhosseini, Seyed Mohammadreza
  • Jiang, Janet Hua
  • Zhu, Yu
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2020

Ähnliche Objekte (12)