Artikel
Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that these widely used models are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. Protocol invariance can facilitate applied work and renders the implications and predictions of a model more robust. Our class of dynamic stochastic games includes investment games, R\&D races, models of industry dynamics, dynamic public contribution games, asynchronously repeated games, and many other models from the extant literature.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 597-646 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Dynamic stochastic games
timing of decisions
commitment
protocol invariance
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Doraszelski, Ulrich
Escobar, Juan F.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2019
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE3230
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Doraszelski, Ulrich
- Escobar, Juan F.
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2019
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