Artikel

Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games

We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that these widely used models are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. Protocol invariance can facilitate applied work and renders the implications and predictions of a model more robust. Our class of dynamic stochastic games includes investment games, R\&D races, models of industry dynamics, dynamic public contribution games, asynchronously repeated games, and many other models from the extant literature.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 597-646 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Dynamic stochastic games
timing of decisions
commitment
protocol invariance

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Doraszelski, Ulrich
Escobar, Juan F.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2019

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE3230
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Doraszelski, Ulrich
  • Escobar, Juan F.
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2019

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