Arbeitspapier

Brothers in arms: An experiment on the alliance puzzle

Our experimental analysis of alliances in conflicts leads to three main findings. First, even in the absence of repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this possible solidarity among brothers in arms when fighting against an outside enemy may rapidly deteriorate or disappear as soon as the outside enemy disappears. Third, when fighting an outside enemy, brothers in arms may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against the external enemy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2010-18

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Thema
Alliance
conflict
contest
free-riding
hold-up problem
solidarity

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ke, Changxia
Konrad, Kai A.
Morath, Florian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ke, Changxia
  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Morath, Florian
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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