Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations

Arbeitspapier

We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in - the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction - for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 601

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: international cooperation ; trade and environmental policy negotiations

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Conconi, Paola ; Perroni, Carlo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76029
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET