Arbeitspapier
Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form : should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?
We analyze a sequential game between two symmetric countries when firms can invest in a multinational structure that confers tax savings. Governments are able to commit to long-run tax discrimination policies before firms' decisions are made and before statutory capital tax rates are chosen non-cooperatively. Whether a coordinated reduction in the tax preferences granted to mobile firms is beneficial or harmful for the competing countries depends critically on the elasticity with which the firms' organizational structure responds to tax discrimination incentives. The model can be applied to policy initiatives that aim at a ban on preferential tax regimes and at reducing the profit shifting opportunities for multinational firms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1625
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Multinational Firms; International Business
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
- Thema
-
tax competition
multinational firms
preferential treatment
Steuerwettbewerb
Steuerbegünstigung
Multinationales Unternehmen
Rechtsformwahl
Kapitalertragsteuer
Extensives Spiel
Zwei-Länder-Modell
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bucovetsky, Sam
Haufler, Andreas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bucovetsky, Sam
- Haufler, Andreas
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2005
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