Arbeitspapier

Cash-in-hand, benefit fraud and unemployment insurance

Recent evidence questions the nature of the re-employment spike as unemployment insurance (UI) payments expire. Unemployed agents do not appear to devote more time to search and are observed leaving the UI scheme early without necessarily entering employment. We show that benefit fraud is consistent with both observations. Over time, UI recipients become increasingly willing to accept short-term cash-in-hand work. This takes them away from job search. Im- mediately before UI expiry, the risk of punishment for fraud exceeds the value of remaining payments. Recipients may voluntarily leave the scheme to accept cash-in-hand opportunities.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2015/4

Classification
Wirtschaft
Informal Labor Markets
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Subject
Cash-in-hand
Benefit fraud
Unemployment insurance
Re-employment spike

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Long, Ian W.
Polito, Vito
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(where)
Cardiff
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Long, Ian W.
  • Polito, Vito
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Time of origin

  • 2015

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