Arbeitspapier

Benefit Reentitlement Conditions in Unemployment Insurance Schemes

Unemployment insurance schemes include conditions on past employment history as part of the eligibility conditions. This aspect is often neglected in the literature which primarily focuses on benefit levels and benefit duration. In a search-matching framework we show that benefit duration and employment requirements are substitute instruments in affecting job search incentives and thus gross unemployment. We analyse the optimal design of the unemployment insurance system (benefit levels, duration and employment requirements) under a utilitarian social welfare function. Simulations show that a higher insurance motive captured by more risk aversion implies higher benefit generosity and more lax employment requirements but also shortened benefit duration.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8991

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Thema
reentitlement effects
unemployment insurance
business cycle

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Andersen, Torben M.
Kristoffersen, Mark Strom
Svarer, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Andersen, Torben M.
  • Kristoffersen, Mark Strom
  • Svarer, Michael
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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