Arbeitspapier
When are mixed equilibria relevant?
Mixed Nash equilibria are a cornerstone of game theory, but their empirical relevance has always been controversial. We study in the laboratory two games whose unique NE is in completely mixed strategies; other treatments include the matching protocol (pairwise random vs population mean-matching), whether time is discrete or continuous, and whether players can specify mixtures or only pure strategies. Comparing point predictions, NE always does better than maximin and often does no worse than Logit QRE. NE predicts better than Center (50-50 mixes) under mean-matching, but otherwise not as well. By contrast, in a dominance solvable game, NE predicts better than alternatives in all treatments. Qualitative and quantitative dynamic models capture regularities across all treatments.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 747
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Subject
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Nash equilibrium
minimax
mixed strategy
directional learning
laboratory experiment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Friedman, Daniel
Zhao, Shuchen
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of California, Economics Department
- (where)
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Santa Cruz, CA
- (when)
-
2019
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Friedman, Daniel
- Zhao, Shuchen
- University of California, Economics Department
Time of origin
- 2019
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