Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests

Arbeitspapier

Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter ("2 < R < É") has countably infinitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accumulation. With contestants randomizing over a non-convex set, there is a cost of being "halfhearted," which is absent from both the lottery contest and the all-pay auction. Numerical bid distributions are generally negatively skewed, and exhibit, for some parameter values, a higher probability of ex-post overdissipation than the all-pay auction.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 143

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: Tullock contest ; mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium ; analytical functions

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ewerhart, Christian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Zurich, Department of Economics
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2014

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5167/uzh-93905
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/111200
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET