Optimal dynamic auctions

Arbeitspapier

We consider a dynamic auction problem motivated by the traditional single-leg, multi-period revenue management problem. A seller with C units to sell faces potential buyers with unit demand who arrive and depart over the course of T time periods. The time at which a buyer arrives, her value for a unit as well as the time by which she must make the purchase are private information. In this environment, we derive the revenue maximizing Bayesian incentive compatible selling mechanism.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1461

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Subject: dynamic mechanism design ; optimal auctions ; virtual valuation ; revelation principle ; Auktionstheorie ; Dynamisches Modell ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Pai, Mallesh ; Vohra, Rakesh V.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31175
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET