Arbeitspapier

Appropriate monetary policy and forecast disagreement at the FOMC

I assess how dissenting views on appropriate monetary policy result in disagreement about the macroeconomic outlook of Federal Open Market Committee members. FOMC members that voted for a higher Fed Funds Rate than the majority of voters also forecast higher inflation rates, while they forecast lower unemployment rates relative to the consensus view on the future economy. Voters that tighten their stance revise inflation forecasts to the upside and unemployment forecasts to the downside. Members that switched their voting status between forecasting rounds, i.e., switched from voting with the majority to being a dissenting minority voter, or switched vice versa, are significantly more hesitant in revising their macroeconomic forecasts.

ISBN
978-3-95729-421-0
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bundesbank Discussion Paper ; No. 39/2017

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Hypothesis Testing: General
Monetary Policy
Thema
Federal Reserve System
Federal Open Market Committee
Federal Funds Rate
Dissent
Forecast Disagreement

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schultefrankenfeld, Guido
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsche Bundesbank
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schultefrankenfeld, Guido
  • Deutsche Bundesbank

Entstanden

  • 2017

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