Arbeitspapier

Appropriate monetary policy and forecast disagreement at the FOMC

I assess how dissenting views on appropriate monetary policy result in disagreement about the macroeconomic outlook of Federal Open Market Committee members. FOMC members that voted for a higher Fed Funds Rate than the majority of voters also forecast higher inflation rates, while they forecast lower unemployment rates relative to the consensus view on the future economy. Voters that tighten their stance revise inflation forecasts to the upside and unemployment forecasts to the downside. Members that switched their voting status between forecasting rounds, i.e., switched from voting with the majority to being a dissenting minority voter, or switched vice versa, are significantly more hesitant in revising their macroeconomic forecasts.

ISBN
978-3-95729-421-0
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bundesbank Discussion Paper ; No. 39/2017

Classification
Wirtschaft
Hypothesis Testing: General
Monetary Policy
Subject
Federal Reserve System
Federal Open Market Committee
Federal Funds Rate
Dissent
Forecast Disagreement

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schultefrankenfeld, Guido
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Deutsche Bundesbank
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schultefrankenfeld, Guido
  • Deutsche Bundesbank

Time of origin

  • 2017

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