Budgetary interests and the degree of unbundling in electricity markets: An empirical analysis for OECD countries

Arbeitspapier

The degree of liberalization in OECD electricity markets varies considerably across countries. Commonly explained by diverging economic performances, corruption levels or government ideologies, this paper suggest another potential reason for cross-national differences in market reforms: given the high financial dependence of regulatory actors on public funding both in the past and nowadays, we expect regulators to increasingly refrain from [foster] the implementation of liberalization steps, the more such measures reduce [raise] the revenues of a tax; this prevents [aims at realizing] substantial decreases [increases] in public revenues (being a major source of regulatory funds) and thus most likely also in the regulators' budgets. Estimation results substantiate these considerations for both the corporate income tax and (in cases of a high price elasticity of power demand) the VAT on electricity.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) ; No. 543

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Regulation and Industrial Policy: General ; Electric Utilities ; Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy
• Subject: Electricity Market Reform ; Vertical Separation ; Regulatory Authorities

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lindemann, Henrik
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
• (where): Hannover
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/117713
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET