Arbeitspapier

Regulatory objectives and the intensity of unbundling in electricity markets

Despite the positive effect electricity grids separated from generation and supply by ownership are expected to have on the level of competition in the non-network activities, several EU member states still adhere to a solely legally unbundled transmission grid. This choice might be induced by regulators focusing on objectives other than the promotion of consumer interests: theoretically analyzing the decisions an authority takes on both the unbundling regime and the grid charge when it supervises a network monopolist providing a downstream Cournot duopoly with capacity, we find an agency pursuing consumer-oriented goals to always implement Ownership Unbundling. For a regulator acting in the interests of the industry or the government, though, results suggest the authority to be indifferent between Legal and Ownership Unbundling; minor potential drawbacks of a network separated by ownership for the agency or the companies might then tip the scales and cause the regulator to adhere to Legal Unbundling.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) ; No. 544

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
Economics of Regulation
Electric Utilities
Thema
Legal Unbundling
Ownership Unbundling
Regulatory Authorities
Regulatory Objectives

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lindemann, Henrik
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
Hannover
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
16.04.2025, 08:43 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lindemann, Henrik
  • Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2015

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