Arbeitspapier

Fight Alone or Together? The Need to Belong

Alliances often face both free-riding and hold-up problems, which under- mine the effectiveness of alliances in mobilizing joint fighting effort. Despite of these disadvantages, alliances are still ubiquitous in all types of contests. This paper asks if there are non-monetary incentives to form alliances, e.g., intimidating/discouraging the single player(s) who is/are left alone. For this purpose, I compare symmetric (2 vs. 2) and asymmetric (2 vs. 1) contests to their equivalent 4-player and 3-player individual contests, respectively. We find that alliance players in symmetric (2 vs. 2) contests behave the same as those in equivalent 4-player individual contests. However, in asymmetric (2 vs. 1) contests, stand-alone players were strongly discouraged to exert effort (especially the females), compared to the 3-player individual contests. Alliance players may have anticipated this effect and also reduced their effort, if alliances share the prize according to the merit rule. Behavioural factors such as the need to belong can help reconcile the paradox of alliance formation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 421

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
Alliance Formation
Contest and Conflict
Experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ke, Changxia
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17247
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17247-2
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ke, Changxia
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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