Arbeitspapier
Clausewitz on Auctions
A multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are modeled as private value all-pay auctions with asymmetric combatants of two opposing teams. These auctions are placed within a multi-stage framework with a tug-of-war structure. Such framing provides a microfounded rationale for the use of the popular logit Tullock contest success function in models of militarized conflicts, yields new theoretical justification for existing empirical findings with respect to war, and provides new hypotheses regarding strategic battlefield behavior.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: WWZ Discussion Paper ; No. 2012/12
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
National Security and War
- Subject
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Auction
War
Multi-Stage Contest
Tug-of War
Tullock Contest Success Function
Microfoundation
Krieg
Rationalität
Auktionstheorie
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Häfner, Samuel
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2012
- DOI
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doi:10.5451/unibas-ep61601
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Häfner, Samuel
- University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
Time of origin
- 2012