Arbeitspapier

Clausewitz on Auctions

A multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are modeled as private value all-pay auctions with asymmetric combatants of two opposing teams. These auctions are placed within a multi-stage framework with a tug-of-war structure. Such framing provides a microfounded rationale for the use of the popular logit Tullock contest success function in models of militarized conflicts, yields new theoretical justification for existing empirical findings with respect to war, and provides new hypotheses regarding strategic battlefield behavior.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WWZ Discussion Paper ; No. 2012/12

Classification
Wirtschaft
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
National Security and War
Subject
Auction
War
Multi-Stage Contest
Tug-of War
Tullock Contest Success Function
Microfoundation
Krieg
Rationalität
Auktionstheorie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Häfner, Samuel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
(where)
Basel
(when)
2012

DOI
doi:10.5451/unibas-ep61601
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Häfner, Samuel
  • University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)

Time of origin

  • 2012

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