Artikel
Public goods and decay in networks
We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of thewhole group. Themodel assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 73-90 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Subject
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Public good
Networks
Decay
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Fatas, Enrique
Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
Morales, Antonio J.
Solaz, Hector
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Springer
- (where)
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Heidelberg
- (when)
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2015
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s13209-014-0114-x
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Fatas, Enrique
- Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
- Morales, Antonio J.
- Solaz, Hector
- Springer
Time of origin
- 2015