Artikel

Public goods and decay in networks

We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of thewhole group. Themodel assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 73-90 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Classification
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Subject
Public good
Networks
Decay

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fatas, Enrique
Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
Morales, Antonio J.
Solaz, Hector
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Springer
(where)
Heidelberg
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.1007/s13209-014-0114-x
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Fatas, Enrique
  • Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
  • Morales, Antonio J.
  • Solaz, Hector
  • Springer

Time of origin

  • 2015

Other Objects (12)