Artikel

Public goods and decay in networks

We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of thewhole group. Themodel assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 73-90 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
Public good
Networks
Decay

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fatas, Enrique
Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
Morales, Antonio J.
Solaz, Hector
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Springer
(wo)
Heidelberg
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.1007/s13209-014-0114-x
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Fatas, Enrique
  • Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
  • Morales, Antonio J.
  • Solaz, Hector
  • Springer

Entstanden

  • 2015

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