Arbeitspapier

A note on the U-shaped relationship between political competition and economic freedom

We investigate a recent political theory of institutional change according to which institutions of economic freedom are more likely to be adopted at the extreme cases of strong and weak political competition than at cases in between. We find that such a U-shaped relationship is verified when controlling for other political variables and past economic growth, but disappears when controlling for the initial level of development. In this case, the relationship between political competition and the adoption of institutions of economic freedom appears to be positive and linear as suggested by the political principal-agent paradigm.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Development Research Working Paper Series ; No. 07/2008

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Comparative Studies of Countries
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Thema
Economic Freedom
Institutional Change
Political Competition
Political Institutions
Institutioneller Wandel
Public Choice

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Saravia, Antonio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD)
(wo)
La Paz
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Saravia, Antonio
  • Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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