Arbeitspapier

Is there a U-shaped Relation between competition and Investment?

We argue that, in a simple setting, the relation between the intensity of competition and cost-reducing investment is U-shaped. We consider a two-stage game with cost-reducing investments followed by a linear differentiated Cournot duopoly. We first show that, except for firms that are much less efficient than the competitor, investment in the subgame-perfect equilibrium is minimal for intermediate levels of competition, which is inversely parameterized by the extent of product differentiation. An extensive set of laboratory experiments also provides support for the U-shape, both for symmetric firms and for leaders. Also consistent with predictions, the relation is negative for firms that are lagging behind.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 0808

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Thema
investment
intensity of competition
experiment
Investition
Wettbewerb
Marktstruktur
Oligopol
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sacco, Dario
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sacco, Dario
  • University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute

Entstanden

  • 2008

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