Arbeitspapier

A note on the U-shaped relationship between political competition and economic freedom

We investigate a recent political theory of institutional change according to which institutions of economic freedom are more likely to be adopted at the extreme cases of strong and weak political competition than at cases in between. We find that such a U-shaped relationship is verified when controlling for other political variables and past economic growth, but disappears when controlling for the initial level of development. In this case, the relationship between political competition and the adoption of institutions of economic freedom appears to be positive and linear as suggested by the political principal-agent paradigm.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Development Research Working Paper Series ; No. 07/2008

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Comparative Studies of Countries
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Subject
Economic Freedom
Institutional Change
Political Competition
Political Institutions
Institutioneller Wandel
Public Choice

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Saravia, Antonio
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD)
(where)
La Paz
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Saravia, Antonio
  • Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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