Arbeitspapier

Equilibrium Vengeance

This paper introduces two ideas, emotional state dependent utility components (ESDUCs), and evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE). Using a simple extensive form game, we illustrate the efficiency-enhancing role of a powerful ESDUC, the vengeance motive. Incorporating behavioral noise and observational noise leads to a range of (short run) Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) involving both vengeful and non-vengeful types. We then derive two (long run) EPBE, one where both types survive and reap mutual gains, and a second where only the non-vengeful type survives and there are no mutual gains.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 766

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Current Heterodox Approaches: Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
Thema
negative reciprocity
perfect Bayesian equilibrium
evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium
emotional state dependent utility

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Friedman, Daniel
Singh, Nirvikar
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Friedman, Daniel
  • Singh, Nirvikar
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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