Equilibrium Vengeance

Arbeitspapier

This paper introduces two ideas, emotional state dependent utility components (ESDUCs), and evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE). Using a simple extensive form game, we illustrate the efficiency-enhancing role of a powerful ESDUC, the vengeance motive. Incorporating behavioral noise and observational noise leads to a range of (short run) Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) involving both vengeful and non-vengeful types. We then derive two (long run) EPBE, one where both types survive and reap mutual gains, and a second where only the non-vengeful type survives and there are no mutual gains.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 766

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Current Heterodox Approaches: Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers ; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
• Subject: negative reciprocity ; perfect Bayesian equilibrium ; evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium ; emotional state dependent utility

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Friedman, Daniel ; Singh, Nirvikar
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76065
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET