Arbeitspapier

Private-Beliefs Equilibrium

At a private-beliefs equilibrium of an n-person infinitely repeated game with discounting, each player maximizes his expected payoff relative to some private, possibly false, belief regarding the strategies chosen by his opponents. Moreover, the probability distribution induced over the observed play paths of the game according to his belie coincides with the one actually played. Thus, any statistical updating can only reinforce the beliefs. It is shown that if the game is played with perfect monitoring, then the joint behavior induced by a private-beliefs equilibrium coincides with a behavior induced by a Nash equilibrium even when perturbations are allowed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 926

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kalai, Ehud
Lehrer, Ehud
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
1991

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kalai, Ehud
  • Lehrer, Ehud
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Entstanden

  • 1991

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