Arbeitspapier
Network architecture and mutual monitoring in public goods experiments
Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and punish each other (i.e., in a complete network). The architecture of social networks becomes important when individuals can only monitor and punish the other individuals to whom they are connected by the network. We study several non-trivial network architectures that give rise to their own distinctive patterns of behavior. Nevertheless, a number of simple, yet fundamental, properties in graph theory allow us to interpret the variation in the patterns of behavior that arise in the laboratory and to explain the impact of network architecture on the efficiency and dynamics of the experimental outcomes.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5307
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Subject
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experiment
networks
public good
monitoring
punishment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Carpenter, Jeffrey
Kariv, Shachar
Schotter, Andrew
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Carpenter, Jeffrey
- Kariv, Shachar
- Schotter, Andrew
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2010