Arbeitspapier

Network architecture and mutual monitoring in public goods experiments

Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and punish each other (i.e., in a complete network). The architecture of social networks becomes important when individuals can only monitor and punish the other individuals to whom they are connected by the network. We study several non-trivial network architectures that give rise to their own distinctive patterns of behavior. Nevertheless, a number of simple, yet fundamental, properties in graph theory allow us to interpret the variation in the patterns of behavior that arise in the laboratory and to explain the impact of network architecture on the efficiency and dynamics of the experimental outcomes.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5307

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Subject
experiment
networks
public good
monitoring
punishment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Carpenter, Jeffrey
Kariv, Shachar
Schotter, Andrew
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Carpenter, Jeffrey
  • Kariv, Shachar
  • Schotter, Andrew
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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