Corporate Profit Tax and Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility Under Foreign Acquisition

Abstract: This study investigates government public policies facing competing firms’ strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and finds that the choice of CSR crucially depends on corporate profit tax. We demonstrate that strategic CSR decreases while social welfare increases with corporate tax. When the government grants uniform output subsidies, we show that bilateral CSR leads to a lower CSR level than under unilateral CSR but bilateral CSR is always beneficial to society. However, when the government grants discriminatory output subsidies which yield different levels of unilateral CSR, we show that domestic CSR leads to a lower CSR level than under foreign CSR. In an endogenous CSR choice game, domestic CSR (no CSR) is a Nash equilibrium when corporate tax is low (high) under the uniform subsidy, while foreign CSR could be a Nash equilibrium when corporate tax is low under the discriminatory subsidy.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Corporate Profit Tax and Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility Under Foreign Acquisition ; volume:22 ; number:1 ; year:2020 ; pages:123-151 ; extent:29 ; The B.E. journal of theoretical economics ; 22, Heft 1 (2020), 123-151 (gesamt 29)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Xu, Lili ; Lee, Sang-Ho

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0028
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023102314181209804378
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 14.08.2025, 10:46 MESZ