Screening stringency in the disability insurance program

Arbeitspapier

We propose a strategy for assessing how the inflow to the disability insurance program has been governed over time. We analyze the ex-ante health of individuals entering the program, compared to individuals not entering the program in the same year, by using ex-post mortality. Applying the strategy to Sweden, we find large variation in the relative health of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries over time. Some of the fluctuations correspond well to formal changes to screening stringency. However, we also find large variation in health during periods when no changes to formal eligibility criteria have been pursued.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2013:10

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies ; Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination
• Subject: disability insurance ; screening stringency ; proportional hazard model ; Erwerbsunfähigkeitsrente ; Gesundheit ; Statistische Bestandsanalyse ; Schweden

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Johansson, Per ; Laun, Lisa ; Laun, Tobias
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy (IFAU)
• (where): Uppsala
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82259
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET