Arbeitspapier

On Harsanyi Payoff Vectors and the Weber Set

The paper discusses the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors,also known as the Selectope. First, we reconsider some results on Harsanyi payoff vectors, published by Vasil'ev in the late 1970's, within a more general framework. In particular, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a result that recently has been proven by Derks et. al.(2000). The marginal contribution vectors are examples of Harsanyi payoff vectors so that the Weber set, being the convex hull of the marginal contribution vectors, is a subset of the Harsanyi set, which denotes the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors. We provide two characterizations of those Harsanyi payoff vectors that are elements of the Weber set.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 02-105/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Thema
TU-games
Core
Harsanyi set
Weber set
Selectope.
Kooperatives Spiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Transferable Utility Games
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Derks, Jean
van der Laan, Gerard
Vasil'ev, Valeri
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Derks, Jean
  • van der Laan, Gerard
  • Vasil'ev, Valeri
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2002

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