Artikel
Estimating price sensitivity of economic agents using discontinuity in nonlinear contracts
This paper proposes a method to estimate price sensitivity of economic agents exploiting discontinuity in nonlinear contracts. As an application, we study contracts between a managed care organization and hospitals for organ transplants. Exploiting donut holes in the reimbursement contracts, we show that the impact of the reimbursement rate on hospitals' provision of health care services varies significantly across patients with different levels of illness severity. Our methodology is applicable to important classes of models such as consumer choice under nonlinear pricing and contracting with nonlinear incentives.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 397-433 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
Model Construction and Estimation
Analysis of Health Care Markets
- Thema
-
Nonlinear contracts
heterogeneity in price sensitivity
health care
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bajari, Patrick L.
Hong, Han
Park, Minjung
Town, Robert J.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2017
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/QE602
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Bajari, Patrick L.
- Hong, Han
- Park, Minjung
- Town, Robert J.
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2017
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