Pooling hawks and doves: Interim-efficient labor contracts for other-regarding agents

Konferenzbeitrag

Behavioral contract theory typically argues that agents who differ in their intrinsic motivations to collaborate or to compete would be screened by principals or self-sort in labor market equilibrium. This view contrasts with the empirical observation that workers' perceived support from coworkers is a key factor for labor turnover. The present study considers a principal-multiple agents model with independent efforts. Agents are privately informed about their more or less pronounced altruistic (spiteful) preferences. It is shown that the interim-efficient labor contract is a pooling contract that ex interim Pareto-dominates any allocation that could be achieved under complete information. Hence, all parties prefer the composition of social types to be random. The distributive effects of interim-efficient contracting are closely related to the hawk-dove game, with workers suffering from less altruistic coworkers. The results indicate that corporate culture has a random component associated with workers' intrinsic motivations to collaborate or to compete.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Corporate Governance ; No. A11-V1

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Economics of Contract: Theory ; Personnel Economics: General

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Daske, Thomas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (wo): Kiel und Hamburg
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145951
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ