Knowledge Transfer in Buyer-Supplier Relationships - When It (Not) Occurs

Arbeitspapier

Abuyer?s technical knowledge may increase the efficiency of its supplier. Suppliers, however, frequently maintain relationships with additional buyers. Knowledge disclosure then bears the risk of benefiting one?s own competitor due to opportunistic knowledge transmission through the common supplier. We show that in one-shot relationships no knowledge disclosure takes place because the supplier has an incentive for knowledge transmission and, in anticipation of this outcome, buyers refuse to disclose any of their knowledge. In repeated relationships knowledge disclosure is stabilized by larger technological proximity between buyers and suppliers and destabilized by the absolute value of the knowledge.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: RWI Discussion Papers ; No. 34

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
• Thema: Knowledge Transfer ; Knowledge Spillovers ; Cooperation ; Innovation ; Repeated Games

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bönte, Werner ; Wiethaus, Lars
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
• (wo): Essen
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18585
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ