Arbeitspapier
The efficient and fair approval of multiple-cost - single-benefit projects under unilateral information
This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-costsingle-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4181
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Externalities
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Thema
-
Indivisible project
single beneficiary
multiple-cost bearers
unilateral information
efficient and fair implementation
Genehmigung
Investition
Projektbewertung
Asymmetrische Information
Mechanism Design
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kahana, Nava
Mealem, Yosef
Nitzan, Shmuel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009061254
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kahana, Nava
- Mealem, Yosef
- Nitzan, Shmuel
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2009