Arbeitspapier

The efficient and fair approval of multiple-cost - single-benefit projects under unilateral information

This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-costsingle-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4181

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Externalities
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Thema
Indivisible project
single beneficiary
multiple-cost bearers
unilateral information
efficient and fair implementation
Genehmigung
Investition
Projektbewertung
Asymmetrische Information
Mechanism Design
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kahana, Nava
Mealem, Yosef
Nitzan, Shmuel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2009

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009061254
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kahana, Nava
  • Mealem, Yosef
  • Nitzan, Shmuel
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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