Efficient promotion of renewable energy with reverse auctions

Arbeitspapier

Despite negative experiences with auctioning off subsidies for renewable energy in some countries, tenders are increasingly used today. We develop a reverse auction which accounts for particularities of intermittent renewable energy sources. Determining the quantity, demanded by the regulator, is internalized and directly linked to his two main objectives. On the one hand, the regulator seeks for a high share of renewable energy. On the other hand, he wants to enhance burden sharing between electricity consumers and renewable electricity producers. We further account for asymmetric information in reverse auctions. We analyze incentives for bidders to manipulate the auction outcome and adapt the design to prevent this behavior. Regional features as grid and generating capacity can be considered to optimize the deployment of renewable energy. We thereby introduce a link to fossil capacity auctions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 20-2015

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Auctions ; Market Design ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General ; Energy: Government Policy
• Thema: Auction Design ; Tendering ; Renewable Energy ; Adverse Selection ; Moral Hazard ; Burden Sharing

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schäfer, Sebastian ; Schulten, Lisa
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
• (wo): Marburg
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119453
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ