Arbeitspapier

Deliberation, Information Aggregation and Collective Decision Making

We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection.Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote onthe project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability thatgood decisions are made. Our most surprising result is that when there are no direct cost ofcommunication and communication can only help to identify the truth, more communication may reducethe probability that a correct decision is made. The reason for this result is that communicationmay aggravate the free-rider problem associated with collecting information.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 02-006/1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
Uncertainty
Deliberation
Learning
Collective decision making
Informationsverhalten
Informationsökonomik
Theorie
Politische Entscheidung

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Swank, Otto H.
Wrasai, Phongthorn
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Swank, Otto H.
  • Wrasai, Phongthorn
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2002

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