Arbeitspapier

Pensions and Fertility Incentives

This paper discusses the efficiency of a pay-as-you-go pension reform by introducing a child benefit in an endogenous fertility setting. In the model of a small open economy, higher fertility is associated with a reduction of lifetime labor supply. The optimum share of fertility-related pensions is always below unity, but generally positive. The former is true since individuals do not take into account the impact of their labor supply choice on the parent generation. It is demonstrated that child allowances are equivalent to fertility-related pensions as instruments to achieve an efficient allocation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 879

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
public pensions
pay-as-you-go
fertility
externalities

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fenge, Robert
Meier, Volker
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fenge, Robert
  • Meier, Volker
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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