Arbeitspapier

Pensions and Fertility Incentives

This paper discusses the efficiency of a pay-as-you-go pension reform by introducing a child benefit in an endogenous fertility setting. In the model of a small open economy, higher fertility is associated with a reduction of lifetime labor supply. The optimum share of fertility-related pensions is always below unity, but generally positive. The former is true since individuals do not take into account the impact of their labor supply choice on the parent generation. It is demonstrated that child allowances are equivalent to fertility-related pensions as instruments to achieve an efficient allocation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 879

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
public pensions
pay-as-you-go
fertility
externalities

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fenge, Robert
Meier, Volker
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fenge, Robert
  • Meier, Volker
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2003

Other Objects (12)