Arbeitspapier
Tax Streams, Land Rents and Urban Land Allocation
This paper examines the fiscal motives behind municipal governments' decisions to allocate commercial and residential land when two categories of land use are subject to different fiscal revenue alternatives: business-related tax and/or land rent. We use urban parcel-level land transfers during China's peak period of urbanization, match commercial parcels with residential parcels, and find significant price discounts on commercial parcels relative to adjacent residential parcels. The observed discounts arise from the future tax flows from commercial use, i.e., expected taxes from developed commercial land reduce its transfer price. We conduct a structural estimation to examine the implications on land use structure of future taxes lowering land transfer prices. Results show that while prospective taxes increase commercial land supply, a significant portion of the favorable treatment impact is mitigated by market price responses, suggesting that the land market counters commercial land favoritism when local revenues include both business-related taxes and land value-based charges. The results have implications for the design of urban public revenue systems.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10812
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity
Housing Supply and Markets
Production Analysis and Firm Location: Government Policy
- Thema
-
fiscal incentives
land transfer
spatial matching
land use
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Tang, Yugang
Su, Zhihao
Hou, Yilin
Yin, Zhendong
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Tang, Yugang
- Su, Zhihao
- Hou, Yilin
- Yin, Zhendong
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2023
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