Why MREL won't help much : minimum requirements for bail-in capital as insufficient remedy for defunct private sector involvement under the European bank resolution framework
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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SAFE working paper series ; No. 180
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (where)
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Frankfurt am Main
- (who)
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Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
- (when)
-
2017
- Creator
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-444482
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:21 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Tröger, Tobias
- Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Time of origin
- 2017
Other Objects (12)
Why MREL won't help much : minimum requirements for bail -in capital as insufficient remedy for defunct private sector involvement under the European bank resolution framework
Too complex to work : a critical assessment of the bail-in tool under the European Recovery and Resolution Regime
Regulatory influence on market conditions in the banking union : the cases of macro-prudential instruments and the bail-in tool
Regulatory influence on market conditions in the banking union : the cases of macro-prudential instruments and the bail-in tool
Too complex to work: a critical assessment of the bail-in tool under the european bank recovery and resolution regime
Who should hold bail-inable debt and how can regulators police holding restrictions effectively?
Arbeitsteilung und Vertrag : Verantwortlichkeit für das Fehlverhalten Dritter in Vertragsbeziehungen
The Single Supervisory Mechanism - Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? : preliminary assessment of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with ECB involvement
Organizational choices of banks and the effective supervision of transnational financial institutions
Germany's reluctance to regulate related party transactions
The Single Supervisory Mechanism – Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? : Preliminary assessments of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with the ECB involvement [[Elektronische Ressource]]
How special are they? - Targeting systemic risk by regulating shadow banking : (October 5, 2014)
Why MREL won't help much : minimum requirements for bail -in capital as insufficient remedy for defunct private sector involvement under the European bank resolution framework
Too complex to work : a critical assessment of the bail-in tool under the European Recovery and Resolution Regime
Regulatory influence on market conditions in the banking union : the cases of macro-prudential instruments and the bail-in tool
Regulatory influence on market conditions in the banking union : the cases of macro-prudential instruments and the bail-in tool
Too complex to work: a critical assessment of the bail-in tool under the european bank recovery and resolution regime
Who should hold bail-inable debt and how can regulators police holding restrictions effectively?
Arbeitsteilung und Vertrag : Verantwortlichkeit für das Fehlverhalten Dritter in Vertragsbeziehungen
The Single Supervisory Mechanism - Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? : preliminary assessment of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with ECB involvement
Organizational choices of banks and the effective supervision of transnational financial institutions
Germany's reluctance to regulate related party transactions
The Single Supervisory Mechanism – Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? : Preliminary assessments of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with the ECB involvement [[Elektronische Ressource]]
How special are they? - Targeting systemic risk by regulating shadow banking : (October 5, 2014)
Why MREL won't help much : minimum requirements for bail -in capital as insufficient remedy for defunct private sector involvement under the European bank resolution framework
Too complex to work : a critical assessment of the bail-in tool under the European Recovery and Resolution Regime
Regulatory influence on market conditions in the banking union : the cases of macro-prudential instruments and the bail-in tool
Regulatory influence on market conditions in the banking union : the cases of macro-prudential instruments and the bail-in tool
Too complex to work: a critical assessment of the bail-in tool under the european bank recovery and resolution regime
Who should hold bail-inable debt and how can regulators police holding restrictions effectively?
Arbeitsteilung und Vertrag : Verantwortlichkeit für das Fehlverhalten Dritter in Vertragsbeziehungen
The Single Supervisory Mechanism - Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? : preliminary assessment of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with ECB involvement
Organizational choices of banks and the effective supervision of transnational financial institutions
Germany's reluctance to regulate related party transactions
The Single Supervisory Mechanism – Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? : Preliminary assessments of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with the ECB involvement [[Elektronische Ressource]]