Arbeitspapier
Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?
We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus / avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts. We discuss possible reasons for this null result.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2016-01
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- Subject
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contract framing
bonus
penalty
fine
loss aversion
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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de Quidt, Jonathan
Fallucchi, Francesco
Kölle, Felix
Nosenzo, Daniele
Quercia, Simone
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
- (where)
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Nottingham
- (when)
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2016
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- de Quidt, Jonathan
- Fallucchi, Francesco
- Kölle, Felix
- Nosenzo, Daniele
- Quercia, Simone
- The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
Time of origin
- 2016