Arbeitspapier
Robust contracting in general contract spaces
We consider a general framework of optimal mechanism design under adverse selection and ambiguity about the type distribution of agents. We prove the existence of optimal mechanisms under minimal assumptions on the contract space and prove that centralized contracting implemented via mechanisms is equivalent to delegated contracting implemented via a contract menu under these assumptions. Our abstract existence results are applied to a series of applications that include models of optimal risk sharing and of optimal portfolio delegation.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 242
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Mathematical Methods
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
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robust contracts
nonmetrizable contract spaces
ambiguity
financial markets
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Backhoff-Veraguas, Julio
Beißner, Patrick
Horst, Ulrich
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (wo)
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München und Berlin
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Backhoff-Veraguas, Julio
- Beißner, Patrick
- Horst, Ulrich
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Entstanden
- 2020