Arbeitspapier

Bank Bonus Pay as a Risk Sharing Contract

We argue that risk sharing motivates the bank-wide structure of bonus pay. In the presence of financial frictions that make external financing costly, the optimal contract between shareholders and employees involves some degree of risk sharing whereby bonus pay partially absorbs earnings shocks. Using payroll data for 1:26 million employee-years in all functional divisions of Austrian, German, and Swiss banks, we uncover several empirical patterns in bonus pay that are difficult to rationalize with incentive theories of bonus pay - but support an important risk sharing motive. In particular, bonuses respond to performance shocks that are outside the control of employees because they originate in other bank divisions or even outside the bank.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7495

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Thema
banker compensation
risk sharing
bonus pay
operating leverage

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Efing, Matthias
Hau, Harald
Kampkötter, Patrick
Rochet, Jean-Charles
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Efing, Matthias
  • Hau, Harald
  • Kampkötter, Patrick
  • Rochet, Jean-Charles
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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