Arbeitspapier

Bonus Question: Does Flexible Incentive Pay Dampen Unemployment Dynamics?

We introduce dynamic incentive contracts into a model of unemployment dynamics and present three results. First, wage cyclicality from incentives does not dampen unemployment dynamics: the response of unemployment to shocks is first-order equivalent in an economy with flexible incentive pay and without bargaining, vis-a-vis an economy with rigid wages. Second, wage cyclicality from bargaining dampens unemployment dynamics through the standard mechanism. Third, our calibrated model suggests 46% of wage cyclicality in the data arises from incentives. A standard model without incentives calibrated to weakly procyclical wages, matches unemployment dynamics in our incentive pay model calibrated to strongly procyclical wages.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16481

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Labor Contracts
Thema
incentive contracts
unemployment dynamics
wage rigidity

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gaur, Meghana
Grigsby, John
Hazell, Jonathon
Ndiaye, Abdoulaye
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2023

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gaur, Meghana
  • Grigsby, John
  • Hazell, Jonathon
  • Ndiaye, Abdoulaye
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2023

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