Arbeitspapier

Political competition and tax revenues in developing countries

Building on the literature of the political economy of taxation, this article explores the relationship between political competition and tax revenues using a sample of 89 developing countries from 1988 to 2010. Owing to the inertia of tax variables, we estimate a dynamic panel data model using the Blundell and Bond two-step System-GMM. The analysis led to the following results: political competition positively and significantly affects total tax revenues; however, this general pattern differs slightly across the type of taxes; and the net effect of political competition on tax revenues is negative for countries which have adopted fiscal rules.

ISBN
978-92-9256-160-4
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WIDER Working Paper ; No. 2016/116

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Thema
level of tax revenues
political competition
volatility of tax revenues

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Yogo, Urbain Thierry
Njib, Martine M. Ngo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2016/160-4
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Yogo, Urbain Thierry
  • Njib, Martine M. Ngo
  • The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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