Tax Bunching at the Kink in the Presence of Low Capacity of Enforcement: Evidence from Uruguay

Arbeitspapier

By using a bunching design on rich administrative tax records from Uruguay's tax agency we explore how individual taxpayers respond to personal income taxation in a context with high sheltering opportunities. We estimate a moderated elasticity of taxable income in the first kink point (0.16) driven by a combination of gross labor income and deductions responses. Taxpayers use personal deductions more intensively close to the kink point and undereport income unilaterally or through employer-employee collusion. Our results suggest that policy efforts should be directed at broadening the tax base and improving the enforcement capacities rather than eroding tax progressivity.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 12286

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes ; Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General ; Time Allocation and Labor Supply
• Thema: deductions behavior ; elasticity of labor income ; tax bunching ; personal income taxation ; misreporting ; developing economies

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bergolo, Marcelo ; Burdín, Gabriel ; De Rosa, Mauricio ; Giaccobasso, Matias ; Leites, Martin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2019

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/196784
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ