Import Tariffs Enforcement with Low Administrative Capacity

Arbeitspapier

Import tariff receipts represent an important share of government revenues in many developing countries and there has recently been a surge in empirical studies showing how evasion in this field is a pervasive phenomenon. In the case of import tariffs, the tax base is the product of quantity and unit value, both of which have to be reported and need to be assessed by the custom authority during an audit. I show that when the fiscal authority has an imperfect detection technology, there is an additional incentive for the taxpayer to underdeclare, as a greater declaration in one dimension actually increases the fine when evasion in the other dimension is detected, and a tax base presenting this feature is subject to more evasion compared to a tax base that can be assessed directly. Also, when enforcement capacity is low, voluntary compliance is higher when the importer is required to declare only the total value of imports.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-615-5024-22-1
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2010/26

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations ; Tax Evasion and Avoidance ; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenues: Other Sources of Revenue ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements ; Development Planning and Policy: Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
• Subject: tariff ; tax evasion ; multiplicative tax base ; imperfect detection ; low administrative capacity ; Öffentliche Einnahmen ; Zoll ; Import ; Steuervermeidung ; Steuerpolitik ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Tonin, Mirco
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
• (where): Budapest
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108193
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET