Public and private insurance with costly transactions

Arbeitspapier

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show that efficient transfer schemes should take into account the impact of insurance on unobservable effort and saving choices as well as the relative cost of public and private insurance technologies. We provide suggestive evidence for the empirical relevance of these results by inspecting the cross-country relationship between available indicators of insurance transaction costs and variation in public and private insurance.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5201

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Macroeconomics: Consumption; Saving; Wealth ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
• Thema: public transfers ; private insurance ; moral hazard ; transaction costs ; Privatversicherung ; Versicherung ; Transaktionskosten ; Moral Hazard ; Öffentlicher Transfer ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bertola, Giuseppe ; Koeniger, Winfried
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46181
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ